摘要
Mark Solms raises the issue of the neuronal and conceptual characterization of consciousness. He focuses very much on stimulus-induced activity in relation to affective and cognitive functions. This, though, implies a content-based view of consciousness that defines consciousness by its contents - that is, affective and cognitive. Beside content, recent discussions often consider the level of consciousness associated with brainstem/midbrain as a second dimension of consciousness. However recent data about the intrinsic activity of the brain suggest the need to include a third dimension - form (or structure or organization) - in the characterization of consciousness. The commentary spells this out, including the implications for the neural correlates of consciousness and Solms's view.
原文 | 英語 |
---|---|
頁(從 - 到) | 59-62 |
頁數 | 4 |
期刊 | Neuropsychoanalysis |
卷 | 15 |
發行號 | 1 |
出版狀態 | 已發佈 - 1月 1 2013 |
對外發佈 | 是 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- 神經心理學與生理心理學
- 神經科學 (全部)