Abstract

It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is, there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here, I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multidimensional model that integrates personal and sub-personal components, psychological and neural processes. I then proceed to show how this model can be applied to explain the action-related passivity experiences of persons suffering from schizophrenia. I argue that a distinctive phenomenological mark of these experiences is that they are vividly felt, unlike ordinary actions (those taken to belong to self), and I seek to explain these heightened sensory experiences from within the proposed framework. I also propose hypotheses concerning such phenomena as thought insertion and anarchic hand syndrome that are motivated by this framework. Finally, I argue that the proposed model and view of self-experiences is consistent with several aspects of and theories of consciousness, especially theories which indicate that consciousness is more likely to be engaged when we are dealing with novelty or error—e.g., when self seems to have gone missing. I conclude by recommending that if we wish to learn about self, we would be well advised to attend closely to those times when it seems absent.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCommunicative Action: Selected Papers of the 2013 IEAS Conference on Language and Action
EditorsTzu-Wei Hung
Place of PublicationSingapore
PublisherSpringer Science+Business Media Singapore Private Limited
Pages53-74
Number of pages22
ISBN (Print)9789814585842
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Cite this

Lane, T. J. (2014). When Actions Feel Alien—an Explanatory Model. In T-W. Hung (Ed.), Communicative Action: Selected Papers of the 2013 IEAS Conference on Language and Action (pp. 53-74). Singapore: Springer Science+Business Media Singapore Private Limited. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-4585-84-2_4

When Actions Feel Alien—an Explanatory Model. / Lane, Timothy Joseph.

Communicative Action: Selected Papers of the 2013 IEAS Conference on Language and Action. ed. / Tzu-Wei Hung. Singapore : Springer Science+Business Media Singapore Private Limited, 2014. p. 53-74.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Lane, TJ 2014, When Actions Feel Alien—an Explanatory Model. in T-W Hung (ed.), Communicative Action: Selected Papers of the 2013 IEAS Conference on Language and Action. Springer Science+Business Media Singapore Private Limited, Singapore, pp. 53-74. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-4585-84-2_4
Lane TJ. When Actions Feel Alien—an Explanatory Model. In Hung T-W, editor, Communicative Action: Selected Papers of the 2013 IEAS Conference on Language and Action. Singapore: Springer Science+Business Media Singapore Private Limited. 2014. p. 53-74 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-4585-84-2_4
Lane, Timothy Joseph. / When Actions Feel Alien—an Explanatory Model. Communicative Action: Selected Papers of the 2013 IEAS Conference on Language and Action. editor / Tzu-Wei Hung. Singapore : Springer Science+Business Media Singapore Private Limited, 2014. pp. 53-74
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