Personal identity and brain identity

Georg Northoff, Nils Frederic Wagner

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Say you are looking at an old picture of your high school graduation and recognize yourself as the teenager with the funny haircut. Perhaps, from today’s perspective, the haircut is not all that fashionable anymore, but nonetheless you are certain that the person in the picture is you. But what makes it true that you today and the teenager in the picture are identical-or one and the same person over time? This is a question of diachronic personal identity. In order to answer these kinds of questions, we must know the criterion of personal identity. In other words, we want to know what the necessary and sufficient conditions are that account for a person persisting from one time to another.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages335-351
Number of pages17
ISBN (Electronic)9781317483526
ISBN (Print)9781138898295
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2017
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Person
Personal Identity
Teenagers
High School
Graduation
Diachrony
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Northoff, G., & Wagner, N. F. (2017). Personal identity and brain identity. In The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics (pp. 335-351). Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315708652

Personal identity and brain identity. / Northoff, Georg; Wagner, Nils Frederic.

The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics. Taylor and Francis, 2017. p. 335-351.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Northoff, G & Wagner, NF 2017, Personal identity and brain identity. in The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics. Taylor and Francis, pp. 335-351. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315708652
Northoff G, Wagner NF. Personal identity and brain identity. In The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics. Taylor and Francis. 2017. p. 335-351 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315708652
Northoff, Georg ; Wagner, Nils Frederic. / Personal identity and brain identity. The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics. Taylor and Francis, 2017. pp. 335-351
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