Pain without Power

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Some theories of consciousness emphasize its relationship to language, its emergent quality, and its causal role. Prominent among these theories is the one that Dennett has been developing for nearly four decades. According to Dennett' most recent version, consciousness is a kind of cerebral clout. But consideration of examples of pain-arguably the best candidate on offer for a paradigm of consciousness-reveals that clout is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Moreover, pain doesn't necessarily have the aftermath that is predicted by Dennett's Clout Theory (CT); pain cannot always be accommodated by Dennett's methodology; and, pain does not always conform to Dennett's proposed ontology. Dennett might wish to substitute episodic memory as a preferred paradigm for consciousness, but episodic memory is shown to be non-essential. And, were it to be treated as a paradigm of consciousness, it would create new explanatory problems for CT. Rather than abandoning CT, because it does seem to help explain some pain phenomena and because it does comport well with certain views of language, Ⅰ propose that some of its more intriguing proposals be retained and treated as hypotheses to guide further empirical inquiry. Finally, Ⅰ recommend some specific empirical cases wherein relevant research might be pursued.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)123-182
Number of pages60
Journal政治大學哲學學報
Issue number20
Publication statusPublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Pain
Consciousness
Paradigm
Language
Episodic Memory
Wishes
Ontology
Methodology
Causal

Keywords

  • Pain
  • Consciousness
  • Episodic Memory
  • Dennett
  • Super Blindsight
  • and Rewiring Hypothesis

Cite this

Pain without Power. / Lane, Timothy Joseph.

In: 政治大學哲學學報, No. 20, 2008, p. 123-182.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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