We study the impact of the new regulation for, Global Systematically Important Banks (G-SIBs) on bank efficiency by using Bankscope and World bank database covering the 300 largest banks worldwide during 2011 to 2014. Our empirical results find that being defined as G-SIBs is negative for bank efficiency, in other words, the disadvantage from additional capital surcharge requirement and regulation costs excessed the benefit from Too Big Too Fail. However, in G-SIBs, this phenomenon didn't be found in the highest capital surcharge bucket. This result suggests that these banks may have Too Big Too Fail effect. Besides, in the elements of defining G-SIBs, the G-SIBs which have higher total exposure and substitutability are positive for bank efficiency, and the G-SIBs which have higher complexity and interconnectedness are negative for bank efficiency.