How can Searle avoid property dualism? Epistemic-ontological inference and autoepistemic limitation

Georg Northoff, Kristina Musholt

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Searle suggests biological naturalism as a solution to the mind-brain problem that escapes traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism. We reconstruct Searle's argument and demonstrate that it needs additional support to represent a position truly located between dualism and materialism. The aim of our paper is to provide such an additional argument. We introduce the concept of "autoepistemic limitation" that describes our principal inability to directly experience our own brain as a brain from the first-person perspective. The neglect of the autoepistemic limitation leads to inferences from epistemic properties to ontological features-we call this "epistemic-ontological inference." Searle attempts to avoid such epistemic-ontological inference but does not provide a sufficient argument. Once the autoepistemic limitation is considered, epistemic-ontological inference can be avoided. As a consequence, one can escape traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)589-605
Number of pages17
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Volume19
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 1 2006

Fingerprint

Terminology
Brain
Property Dualism
Ontological
Inference
Dualism
Materialism
Neglect
Naturalism
First-person Perspective
Mind-brain

Keywords

  • Autoepistemic Limitation
  • Epistemic-Ontological Inferences
  • John Searle
  • Property Dualism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Psychology(all)

Cite this

How can Searle avoid property dualism? Epistemic-ontological inference and autoepistemic limitation. / Northoff, Georg; Musholt, Kristina.

In: Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 5, 01.10.2006, p. 589-605.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{c67ea443115a4ecaac0d42b573b44db0,
title = "How can Searle avoid property dualism? Epistemic-ontological inference and autoepistemic limitation",
abstract = "Searle suggests biological naturalism as a solution to the mind-brain problem that escapes traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism. We reconstruct Searle's argument and demonstrate that it needs additional support to represent a position truly located between dualism and materialism. The aim of our paper is to provide such an additional argument. We introduce the concept of {"}autoepistemic limitation{"} that describes our principal inability to directly experience our own brain as a brain from the first-person perspective. The neglect of the autoepistemic limitation leads to inferences from epistemic properties to ontological features-we call this {"}epistemic-ontological inference.{"} Searle attempts to avoid such epistemic-ontological inference but does not provide a sufficient argument. Once the autoepistemic limitation is considered, epistemic-ontological inference can be avoided. As a consequence, one can escape traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism.",
keywords = "Autoepistemic Limitation, Epistemic-Ontological Inferences, John Searle, Property Dualism",
author = "Georg Northoff and Kristina Musholt",
year = "2006",
month = "10",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1080/09515080600901889",
language = "English",
volume = "19",
pages = "589--605",
journal = "Philosophical Psychology",
issn = "0951-5089",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "5",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - How can Searle avoid property dualism? Epistemic-ontological inference and autoepistemic limitation

AU - Northoff, Georg

AU - Musholt, Kristina

PY - 2006/10/1

Y1 - 2006/10/1

N2 - Searle suggests biological naturalism as a solution to the mind-brain problem that escapes traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism. We reconstruct Searle's argument and demonstrate that it needs additional support to represent a position truly located between dualism and materialism. The aim of our paper is to provide such an additional argument. We introduce the concept of "autoepistemic limitation" that describes our principal inability to directly experience our own brain as a brain from the first-person perspective. The neglect of the autoepistemic limitation leads to inferences from epistemic properties to ontological features-we call this "epistemic-ontological inference." Searle attempts to avoid such epistemic-ontological inference but does not provide a sufficient argument. Once the autoepistemic limitation is considered, epistemic-ontological inference can be avoided. As a consequence, one can escape traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism.

AB - Searle suggests biological naturalism as a solution to the mind-brain problem that escapes traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism. We reconstruct Searle's argument and demonstrate that it needs additional support to represent a position truly located between dualism and materialism. The aim of our paper is to provide such an additional argument. We introduce the concept of "autoepistemic limitation" that describes our principal inability to directly experience our own brain as a brain from the first-person perspective. The neglect of the autoepistemic limitation leads to inferences from epistemic properties to ontological features-we call this "epistemic-ontological inference." Searle attempts to avoid such epistemic-ontological inference but does not provide a sufficient argument. Once the autoepistemic limitation is considered, epistemic-ontological inference can be avoided. As a consequence, one can escape traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism.

KW - Autoepistemic Limitation

KW - Epistemic-Ontological Inferences

KW - John Searle

KW - Property Dualism

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33748808960&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33748808960&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/09515080600901889

DO - 10.1080/09515080600901889

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:33748808960

VL - 19

SP - 589

EP - 605

JO - Philosophical Psychology

JF - Philosophical Psychology

SN - 0951-5089

IS - 5

ER -