Higher-order thought and the problem of radical confabulation

Timothy Lane, Caleb Liang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Currently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal's version of higher-order-thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one-component and a two-component view. We further argue that the two-component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the empirical sciences. Unfortunately, the two-component view seems incapable of handling a group of counterexamples that we refer to as cases of radical confabulation. We begin by introducing the HOT theory and by indicating why we believe it is open to distinct interpretations. We then proceed to show that it is incapable of handling cases of radical confabulation. Finally, in the course of considering various possible responses to our position, we show that adoption of a disjunctive strategy, one that would countenance both one-component and two-component versions, would fail to provide any empirical or explanatory advantage.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)69-98
Number of pages30
JournalSouthern Journal of Philosophy
Volume46
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes

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Confabulation
Higher-order Thought
Empirical Science
Counterexample
Consciousness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Higher-order thought and the problem of radical confabulation. / Lane, Timothy; Liang, Caleb.

In: Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2008, p. 69-98.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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